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MINIMUM ROYALTIES.
On the first day of April, 1882, one E. A. Timlin
leased to Thos. Brown and J. L. Hunter a tract in Clarion
,County for a period of ten years. In the words of the instru-
ment, the tract was leased to the said Brown and Hunter "for
-the purpose of mining, digging and excavating the coal
contained thereon." The lessees agreed "to pay as royalty
for coal the sum of one-half cent per bushel for all coal taken
'from said lease; the said royalt)' to be paid monthly, each
and every month." Further, the lessees agreed "to take out
.at least ten thousand bushels of coal each and every year, and
as much more as they choose." Failing to get out ten
-thousand bushels, "they agree to pay a royalty on ten thou-
sand bushels each and every year." If the lessees do not fulfil
-the conditions of the lease, it is to be void, and Timlin may
re-enter, etc. In accordance with the lease, coal was mined
.and royalty paid up to April I, 1889, at which time the coal
had run down to such small proportions as to be unprofitable
-to work, and no more royalty was paid. Timlin sued in 1892,
.after the expiration of the lease, to recover the royalties for the
-past three years. Plaintiff having succeeded in the court
below, the defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court
.affirmed the judgment: Timlin v. Brown, I58 Pa. 6o6.
On April I, 1875, Sarah Steeley etal., leased to Abraham
-Boyer "for the purpose of carrying on the mining of iron ore,
.all the timber land" of the parties of the first part, situated,
-etc. The lessee was given " the exclusive right to dig for,
-raise, and take away iron ore, and (he,) shall continue to work
.during the term of fifteen years from the date hereof." The
lessee agrees to pay to the lessor, "the sum of sixty cents for
-every ton of iron ore sold from said premises during said term,
-to be paid monthly, but the amount to be paid to the said first
party shall in no year be less than four hundred dollars, to be
paid within the year respectively. But in case the second
party should suspend the work for a time or should not mine
.and sell iron ore in any year sufficient to make the annual sum
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due therefrom to the first party four hundred dollars, in such
case however, the said second party shall pay the first party
the said annual sum of four hundred dollars, and said second
party shall have the right to take out and sell iron ore at a
future time to make up for the money paid out as aforesaid
for ore in advance, . . .but no iron ore shall be taken out
after the expiration of this lease for money advanced and no
money advanced as aforesaid shall ever be refunded." Abra-
ham Boyer on Sept. I, 1876, assigned his leasehold to Kate
Boyer, and she assigned it to Henry Fulmer. In the assign-
ment to Fulmer, it was provided as follows: "And he
(Fulmer) also agrees to pay to the said Catharine Boyer, his
heirs and assigns, the additional sum of seventeen and one-half
cents for each and every gross ton of iron ore mined and taken
away from said premises, to be paid monthly to said Catharine
Boyer, said payments to be between the last day of the month
and the fifteenth day of the following month" and further,
"the said Henry Fulmer shall mine and take away and pay
for not less than one thousand tons of iron ore in each and
every year. He shall pay to said Catharine Boyer her royalty
of seventeen and one-half cents per ton on one thousand tons
per annum whether he mines that amount or not." If Fulmer
fails to mine and pay for this amount, the assignment to be
void, etc.
Fulmer worked the mine for three years; and thus, the-
iron being practically exhausted, he ceased operation, and
paid no more royalty. Mrs. Boyer sued to recover royalty
payable after the work had been stopped. She succeeded in
the court below, Fulmer appealed, and the judgment was
reversed, Mr. Justice Mitchell dissenting: Boyer v. Fulmer,
176 Pa. 282.
Timlin v. Brown was not overruled, and is, therefore,
still law. I think counsel would find difficulty in advising
a client in a similar case, for the points of difference between
Timlin v. Brown and Boyer v. Fulner do not "jump at
the eyes," as the French say. I propose to examine them
carefully to see where the real distinction, if any, is to be
found: Both were cases wherein the parties to whom royalty
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'was alleged to be due sued to recover it. Both were cases
wherein no royalty had been paid during the period covered
by the suit.
In Timlim v. Brown, the particular covenant was: "In case
the said Brown and Hunter fails (sic) to get out the amount
.before stated, they agree to pay royalty on ten thousand
bushels each and every year."
In Bayer v. Fulmer, the particular covenant was: " He
shall pay the said Catharine Boyer her royalty of seventeen
and one-half cents per ton on one thousand tons per annum
whether he mines that amount or not."
In both cases the defence was that there had been a practi-
-cal exhaustion of the mineral before the payment of royalty
had ceased.
The reasons for the decision, in Timnlin v. Brown, given by
-the court, speaking through Dean, J., are.
x. The lease constituted a sale of the coal in place at one-
half cent per bushel with a right to a term of ten years in
which to mine and remove it. If there were more than one
hundred thousand bushels mined in ten years, one-half cent
per bushel was to be paid on the excess. That is, it was a
sale of all the coal in place at a minimum price of five hun-
dred dollars.
From the fact that there had been a prior contract with
Brown at a less royalty, for which the one sued on was sub-
stituted, and the additional fact that Brown was already work-
ing an adjoining tract, the court draws the conclusion that
neither party doubted that coal existed under the tract leased,
--SO
2. This is not a case of mutual mistake-and
3. The defendants having contracted to pay could not es-
cape because the mines gave out.
In Boyer v. Fulmer, the court speaking through Green, J.,
gave as reasons for its judgment:
i. The agreements did not constitute a sale of the coal in
place-the tract leased was timber land and arable land under
which the existance of ore was a matter of conjecture-so
2. The defendants' covenant to pay whether he mined or
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not was merely a covenant to pay for iron which he could
have mined if he had chosen.
One day some years ago, when the late Judge Ludlow was.
presiding in the Court of Common Pleas No. 3, Philadelphia,
a young gentleman came into court just as the judge had com--
pleted a call of the trial list. He said to the court, "If your
Honor pleases, the case of Snooks v. Brown may be stricken,
from the list." The judge ran his eye down the list, and
looking up, said : " Did you say Snooks and Brown? "No,.
sir; Snooks versus Brown."
I must honestly confess that I can see very little more dis-
tinction between these two cases. The question of the amount
of uncertainty in the minds of parties to a mining lease as to.
the existence of the mineral at all in paying quantities is so
impossible of determination that it is a most unsatisfactory test
by which to adjudge their rights and duties. It may safely be
said that no lease is ever entered into without at least very
strong belief in the existence of the mineral-no one would'
execute a mining lease for coal in Philadelphia County, for
example-so that it must be assumed that as reasonable
beings and business men it is their confident expectation, how-
ever mistaken, that the terms of a* lease can be practically
carried out. And to say that because the reasons for the
belief may have been stronger in the one case than in the-
other, the obligation of the contract is not the same, is against
common sense. Besides, admittedly the amount of coal or
iron in place is not positively ascertainable beforehand-so
that there is always uncertainty as to just how nuch will be
available. Now, in Case A. there are strong reasons for be-
lieving in the existence of the mineral. In Case B. the reasons
are still stronger. Yet in both cases the mineral gives out,
contrary to expectations. Is the man who deliberately en-
tered into a contract in Case A. to be excused from its per-
formance because he did not wait for stronger reasons before-
he did so, while the man in Class B. who did have stronger
reasons, is held to a strict accountability? Common sense,.
legal principles, revolt against any such doctrine. The two-
cases which we have been analyzing are absolutely indistin-
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guishable upon any recognizable principle-or at least one-
capable of practical application-and unless a lawyer should be
"so skilled in argument, he could divide a hair twixt South and
Southwest side," he could find it impossible to advise if both
are to stand. We are now brought face to face with the ques-
tion, what is and should be the law? Let us see whether
Timilin v. Brown or Boyer v. Fulmer is most in accord with
the weight of authority ?
The trend of the decisions, which are not numerous in
Pennsylvania, has been to relieve the lessees from payment of
royalty for minerals which have no existence. The case im-
mediately prior to Timlin v. Brown was McCalan v. Wharton,
121 Pa. 424, In thaticase there had been a lease giving the
exclusive right to " prospect for, dig, mine and ship iron ore,"
and "just as soon as iron ore is found in sufficient quantities
to justify the shipping of the same, then the parties of the
second part agree to work the said mines to their utmost
capacity," and they agree "to pay the sum of fifty cents per
ton for each and every ton of iron ore mined and shipped,"
and "in case sufficient iron ore be found, that, then, the mining
and shipments of iron ore shall not be less than twenty-five
hundred tons per year; and that the royalty, if sufficient iron
ore be found, shall in no event be less than twelve hundred.
dollars for each and every year." "It is further understood
that if the parties of the second part do not quit possession of
said premises, and surrender and give up all interest, they
may have in this lease, on or before the first day of July,
1884, the very act of their refusing or neglecting to quit pos--
session and surrender the lease is hereby agreed on their part
that there is a sufficient quantity of iron ore in said property
to pay the royalty of twelve hundred dollars on the first day
of February, I885."
Suit was brought to recover this royalty due, on February
1, 1885. There was some evidence of a surrender of the-
lease. But the court said that the agreement as to the effect
of remaining in possession after July 1, 1884, only threw
upon the defendants the burden of proof that no ore existed,.
that it was not an absolute agreement to pay royalty whether-
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or no. What became of the principle of estoppel is not
mentioned, but the case is another strong indication that
exhaustion or non-existence of minerals is a defence which
the courts strive hard to sustain.
Going backward chronologically, we come next to Muhlen-
berg v. Henning, 1 16 Pa. 138, a leading case. We find there
an instrument in which the plaintiff " granted, bargained and
.sold" to the defendants for five years all the iron ore in a
certain tract of fifty acres in Berks Co. The lessees (so
called in the instrument) agreed to pay "for every ton . . .
mined and taken away . . . the price of thirty-five cents per
ton," and further " to raise, mine, carry away and sell at
least fifteen hundred tons annually . . . or in default thereof
to pay a royalty of five hundred and twenty-five dollars
annually." Suit was brought to recover the sum, and an
-affidavit of defence alleged that in spite of efforts no iron was
found of sufficient quality or quantity to enable the defendants
to comply with the contract. The court below refused judg-
ment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence, the plaintiff
.appealed, but unsuccessfully. Mr. Justice Clark says, in
delivering the opinion of the court, that the transaction was
a sale of the ore in place, and, as no ore was found, the sub-
ject-matter of the contract failed, and the price could not be
recovered. He considers it a case of mutual mistake, both
parties having supposed that ore existed, and while, under
Harlan v. Lehigh Coal Co., 35 Pa. 287, it could not be said
that the lessors had warranted the existence of ore, or that
its mining would be profitable, and so the lessees could not
recover from the lessors the expenses of their vain search,
still equity would not permit the recovery of royalty in such
.a case. And this ruling would seem to be borne out by
Kemble Coal Co. v. Scott, 15 W. N. C. 220; see also Johnston
v. Cowan, 59 Pa. 275. The apparent rule, then, both of
authority and common sense, is: The lessors do not warrant
the existence of the mineral or its quality or profitable work-
ing, and the lessees cannot, therefore, recover sums expended
in an endeavor to find and work it. And they are bound to
use all reasonable effort to perform the contract. But if, in
MINIMUM ROYALTIES.
spite of these efforts, the mineral is insufficient in quantity or
quality to be worked so as to pay the royalty, such facts may
be shown by the lessees, (upon whom is the burden of proof)
in an action for its recovery. Timlin v. Brown is hardly
reconciliable with this view, but it seems to me to stand alone-
Another most interesting case has been decided very re-
cently. I refer to Lehigiz and Wilkesbarre Coal Co. v. Wright,,
177 Pa. 387. In this case the lessees were plaintiffs, and filed
a bill in equity to restrain the lessors from enforcing at law
the forfeiture clause of the lease, and also from re-entry under
the power of attorney to confess judgment, etc. The material
provisions of the lease were: Lessors leased to lessees "all
the coal upon and under" the tract "for and until such time
as all the merchantable anthracite coal shall have been mined
or removed," the lessees to pay twenty-five cents a ton, the
"rent or royalty" to be paid quarterly. Section 2 was as
follows : "And the said party of the second part, its successors.
and assigns, whether coal be mined or not, shall pay to the
said parties of the first part, their executors, administrators and
assigns, in the proportions aforesaid, an annual minimum
rental of not less than four thousand dollars, payable in quar-
terly instalments, . . . and if the said party of the
second part, its successors and assigns shall fail in any year
to mine coal to amount to the said minimum, which it or they
shall have paid, the deficiency may be made up in any subse-
quent year during the the time of this lease without any pay-
ment therefor. And should the breaker of the said party of
the second part, its successors or assigns be destroyed by
fire or other unavoidable cause, the rent may be postponed for
the time which may be necessary to erect a new breaker, not
however, to exceed three months." By Section I I, it was.
agreed that in default of any quarterly payment all the right
of the lessees under the lease should be forfeited at the option
of the lessors; or they might issue a landlord's covenant and
distrains for rent in arrears ; or, in case of forfeiture then by
authority of a power of attorney thereby given, judgment in
ejectment might be confessed and possession taken of the
premises.
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Up to July, I888, payments of royalty were regularly made.
And, then, the plaintiffs notified defendants that they would
pay no more, because the sums already paid more than paid
for the coal mined and all that remained in place. It is stated
in the opinion of the court that the right to timber or other
material in the surface was granted to plaintiff along with the
coal. So that, apparently, they sought to remain in posses-
sion without further payment and take their own time to
remove the balance of the coal. In the opinion of the Master
several years would be necessary to remove the coal, using
reasonable diligence, and, as it had all been paid for, the for-
feiture of the lease before its removal would be unconscion-
able. But the Supreme Court, agreeing with the court below,
and disagreeing with the Master, held, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Dean, that the company could not remain and exer-
cise its surface rights without paying the annual rental.
Since the whole amount which the plaintiffs would have
paid had they taken out every pound of coal had been paid;
and since several years were stated to be reasonably neces-
sary to take out what remained, it is difficult not to agree
thoroughly with the dissenting opinions of Green and Will-
iams, JJ. No cases are cited in the opinion of the court, but
a startling allusion to them is made in these words " It is
useless to go over them, because to be in point, they should
be in verbis ipsissimis concerning the same subject and parties
in the same situation." If cases to be in point must be "in
verbis ipsissimis," counsel need hardly be at pains to search for"
precedents; they will not be likely to find any.
It is much to be regretted that theie is no clear light by
which to guide one's footsteps in cases of this kind. The only
solution of the difficulty for the future, which is at all obvious,
is greater care and more distinct and unambiguous expression
in the preparation of mining leases. It may not be an easy
task to draw an instrument which will be satisfactory to both
parties and unmistakably express their views-but surely in
this age of business-like methods, it ought not to be possible
for questions such as we have been discussing, to arise, espe-
cially after repeated warnings like these cases. I remember
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upon one occasion hearing the learned and distinguished senior
-counsel for the appellees in Lehigh Co. v. right, remark,
.arguendo, that the days were past when courts sat for the pur-.
pose of perpetrating injustice under the forms of law-that
Grose, J., and his contemporaries were never better pleased
than when their ingenuity had discovered some way of legally
inflicting undeserved loss upon some unfortunate suitor, but
that, happily, we had changed all that! After Lehigh Co. v.
.Wright, one does not feel so sure.
Lucius S. Landreth.
Philadelfia, January x, z897.
